In just five years[1], Chinese universities have canceled or put on hold more than 12,000 courses, while opening over 10,000 new ones. The goal is to adjust curricula to match advances in artificial intelligence, emerging technologies, and the needs of the national economy, as many young graduates struggle to find their place in the job market.

The scale of this transformation is remarkable: according to official data, more than 30% of university programs were revised between 2021 and 2025. In concrete terms, over 12,000 courses have disappeared or been suspended, while a little over 10,000 have been created. Schools are thus encouraged to quickly adapt their course offerings to the job market demands and the industrial priorities set by Beijing.

Some programs are being dropped, while others are being highlighted.

The cuts mostly affect the humanities, social sciences, several foreign languages, and management. On the other hand, universities are now focusing on artificial intelligence, data science, semiconductors, and robotics. Some have even launched new courses dedicated to what Beijing calls ’embodied intelligence,’ which means integrating AI into robots that can interact with the real world.

In Shanghai, for example, a university has suspended its product design program, believing that artificial intelligence is already deeply transforming this field. 

China is making this shift quickly. 

The country is facing two challenges at the same time: an unprecedented influx of graduates — nearly 12 million this summer — and a growing difficulty for many of them finding a job that matches their training. Authorities are therefore trying to close the gap between the courses studied and the real opportunities in the job market.

This transformation is also part of a broader strategy. Beijing aims to become a major global player in several technological fields considered essential for its future growth. In this perspective, universities are increasingly seen as tools serving the country’s major industrial priorities, from artificial intelligence to semiconductors.

Geopolitical analysis of this reform

What’s most surprising is the brutality of this reform and the massive focus on engineering sciences, at the expense of the human and social disciplines. We had already noted in this letter, without questioning the obvious progress of Chinese engineering in advancing Artificial Intelligence, the difficulties in implementation whenever it was put at the service of the administration. Blockages appear, which Chinese specialists themselves interpret as linked to the refusal to give initiative to the ground level, in a very top-down approach, typical of dictatorial powers. For example, we are seeing more and more lab directors use AI to write activity reports. AI is pretty handy for saving us time when drafting documents that have to meet a lot of regulatory requirements. Chinese research managers, especially in the social sciences and humanities, have to provide at least ten times as many documents like this. But using AI is strictly forbidden for them: AI serves the authorities, not the people.

More generally, it seems that the entire economy is at the service of the global domination projects openly stated by President Xi himself. In this way, the Chinese economy takes market share at the expense of other national economies, but at the cost of sacrificing social progress. This country keeps accumulating successes in foreign trade, but at the price of the Chinese citizens themselves, who have seen their wages drop and their savings dwindle due to planning that does not prioritize social welfare. The fact that Chinese citizens are becoming poorer is part of the strategy of power, as these same citizens are showing decreasing willingness to work. In fact, while China may appear to visitors as a calm country with remarkable transportation and urban infrastructure in terms of transformation and efficiency, it has become a country where domestic consumption is plummeting.

For an observer who has lived in China regularly over about thirty years, the Chinese have stopped talking to each other. Twenty years ago, you would commonly see Chinese people dancing in the streets in the evening, and in the mornings, groups would practice Qi Gong together. Groups of young people would hang out in parks or bars. Today, groups doing collective dance have disappeared. In the streets, people generally wander alone, with few small groups. There aren’t people talking to each other. They are afraid of responsibilities, avoid taking personal initiatives. China might be a country that threatens us, but it is not a country that is doing well.

Betting massively on Artificial Intelligence looks like a race where the important thing would be to arrive first to dominate the others. Slower in its decisions, Europe has little chance of dominating the others in this area. It has a better chance of avoiding a catastrophe linked to massive overinvestment. And above all, it wants above all to preserve the well-being of its citizens, and to a lesser extent, of the rest of the world. The flows of migrants have largely left China, whether they are poor or rich, educated or not. Curiously, these same flows come to us. We must not admire China, we must be afraid of it.

Debates among experts on Artificial Intelligence are unable to say which training will best match the jobs of tomorrow, even though there is a consensus on trying to strengthen engineering programs. But when in doubt, it is openness of mind that needs to be developed, as well as the ability to be open to new ideas—qualities that are already seriously lacking in the current curriculum for Chinese students.

The reform also aims to make Chinese universities more adaptable. It raises a fundamental question: how do you prepare students for jobs that don’t even exist yet? According to several specialists, schools will need to become more flexible and promote more programs that combine multiple disciplines.

In other words, the challenge is no longer just about choosing a specific degree: it is mainly about learning to adapt to a rapidly changing job market.

[1] This article largely uses the text by Clea Broadhurst for the descriptive part of the reform. The geopolitical part is the responsibility of Jean Ruffier, who, for about thirty years, effectively led a research team in the sociology department at the large Sun Yatsen University in Canton. See https://www.msn.com/fr-fr/finance/g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral/la-chine-met-ses-universit%C3%A9s-%C3%A0-l-heure-de-l-ia-et-bouleverse-ses-cursus/ar-AA29LPIW?ctsrc=dgst&ocid=winp2fp&cvid=a8a81a9b41934d79a856d8c87b637dde&uxmode=ruby&ei=17 and Jean RUFFIER (2025), ‘Help with organizing a conference in Canton on Artificial Intelligence,’ Letter from Academics Without Borders, No. 71, https://univ-sf.org/aide-a-lorganisation-dun-colloque-a-canton-sur-lintelligence-artificielle/